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Abstract 
 
This paper makes four propositions. First, it argues that the euro’s institutional design makes it function like the 
interwar gold exchange standard during periods of stress. Just like the gold exchange standard during the 1930s, the 
euro created a ‘core’ of surplus countries and a ‘periphery’ of deficit countries. The latter have to sacrifice their internal 
domestic economic equilibrium in order to restore their external equilibrium, and therefore have no choice but to 
respond to balance of payments crises by a series of deflationary spending, price and wage cuts. The paper’s second 
claim is that the euro’s institutional design and the EU’s response to its ‘sovereign debt crisis’ during 2010-13 
deepened the recession in the Eurozone periphery, as EMU leaders focused almost exclusively on austerity measures 
and structural reforms and paid only lip service to the need to rebalance growth between North and South.  
 
As Barry Eichengreen argued in Golden Fetters, the rigidity of the gold standard contributed to the length and depth of 
the Great Depression during the 1930s, but also underscored the incompatibility of the system with legitimate national 
democratic government in places like Italy, Germany, and Spain, which is the basis for the paper’s third proposition: 
the euro crisis instigated a crisis of democratic government in Southern Europe underlining that democratic legitimacy 
still mainly resides within the borders of nation states. By adopting the euro, EMU member states gave up their ability 
to control major economic policy decisions, thereby damaging their domestic political legitimacy, which in turn dogged 
attempts to enact structural reforms. Evidence of the erosion of national democracy in the Eurozone periphery can be 
seen in the rise of anti-establishment parties, and the inability of traditional center-left and center-right parties to form 
stable governments and implement reforms. The paper’s fourth proposition is that the euro’s original design and the 
Eurozone sovereign debt crisis further widened the existing democratic deficit in the European Union, as manifested in 
rising anti-EU and anti-euro sentiment, as well as openly Eurosceptic political movements, not just in the euro 
periphery, but also increasingly in the euro core. 
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The decisions of central bankers, long regarded as obscure, became grist for the political 
mill [during the 1930s]. The monetary authorities were attacked from the left for 
upholding outdated monetary doctrines and from the right for pandering to the demands 
of the masses. They consequently lost much of the insulation they once enjoyed. 
 
Barry Eichengreen1 
 
 
A central ingredient in the success of embedded liberalism […] has been its ability to 
facilitate the externalizing of adjustment costs. […] The primacy of domestic objectives 
over external financial discipline was established in the interwar period. The Bretton 
Woods adjustment process, when it worked, worked primarily to devalue the currencies 
of deficit countries and consequently to increase their domestic prices. 
 
John Gerard Ruggie2 
 
 
Monetary union means a restriction in national sovereignty, on national maneuvering 
room and the ability to go it alone. Participants lose the instrument of exchange rate 
adjustments. That strengthens pressures towards internal flexibility. In a monetary union, 
countries have to tackle and solve their economic problems and challenges in a similar 
way and with similar speed. If the countries decide fundamentally different answers, then 
great problems will arise. 
 
Hans Tietmeyer3 
                                                        
1
 Barry Eichengreen, Golden Fetters: The Gold Standard and the Great Depression 1919-1939, New York: 
Oxford University Press, 1992, p. 9 
2
 John Gerard Ruggie, “International Regimes, Transactions, and Change: Embedded Liberalism in the 
Postwar Economic Order,” International Organization 36 (2), spring 1982, p. 413-415 
3
 Hans Tietmeyer, President of the German Bundesbank from 1993 to 1999, said this in a speech in 
Florence (Italy) on November 28, 1996. Quoted in David Marsh, The Euro: The Battle for the New 
GlobalCurrency, New Haven: Yale University Press, 2011, p. 200 
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1. The Euro Crisis and the Consequences of Dis-Embedding Liberalism 
This paper is not about the various causes of the Eurozone crisis, nor is it about the euro 
experience that led up to the sovereign debt crisis; it is about the ideational climate that 
underpinned the institutional design flaws of the euro and the consequences of those 
decisions made in the early 1990s. The ideas that informed the euro’s institutional design 
would ‘lock in’ the future domestic response to the crisis and would make the politics of 
economic adjustment in Europe very problematic. In order to better understand the design 
flaws of the euro, and the sovereign debt crisis that resulted from it in 2010, we need to 
go back to the different lessons that were learned in Europe and the rest of the world from 
the collapse of the Bretton Woods system in the early 1970s. 
 
This paper will explain the length and depth of the euro crisis as the logical consequence 
of the euro’s institutional design, which was the result of an ideational consensus on 
sound money, price stability and ordo-liberal rules. 4  My first claim is that given its 
institutional setup agreed to in the early 1990s, the Eurozone worked in a similar manner 
as the interwar gold exchange standard during periods of economic stress. Also, just like 
the gold standard, the euro created a core of surplus countries and a periphery of deficit 
countries, in which the latter had to sacrifice internal domestic economic equilibrium in 
order to restore external equilibrium, and thus had no choice but to respond to balance of 
payments crises by a series of deflationary spending, price and wage cuts. My second 
claim is that the euro’s institutional design and the EU’s response to its sovereign debt 
crisis during 2010-13 has deepened the recession in the Eurozone periphery, as EMU 
                                                        
4
 See Kathleen R. McNamara, The Currency of Ideas, Ithaca: Cornell University Press, 1998. 
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leaders have focused exclusively on austerity measures and structural reforms and lack 
any coordinating strategy to rebalance growth between North and South.  
 
As Barry Eichengreen has argued in Golden Fetters, the rigidity of the interwar gold 
standard contributed to the length and depth of the Great Depression during the 1930s. 
But he also underscored the incompatibility of the gold standard with legitimate national 
democratic government, as evidenced during the 1930s in Italy, Germany, and Spain.5 
My third claim builds on Eichengreen’s observation, i.e. that the euro crisis instigated a 
crisis of democratic government in Southern Europe – not wholly unlike the one in the 
1930s – and served as a reminder to Brussels that democratic legitimacy still mainly lied 
with the nation state level. By adopting the euro, EMU member states gave up their 
ability to control major economic policy decisions, thereby damaging their domestic 
political legitimacy, which has in turn dogged attempts to enact deep structural reforms. 
Evidence of the erosion of national democracy in the Eurozone periphery can be seen in 
the rise of anti-establishment parties and the inability of moderate center-left and center-
right parties to form stable governments and implement reforms in Europe’s 
Mediterranean periphery countries. My fourth claim, following from the third, is that the 
Eurozone sovereign debt crisis has further widened the existing democratic deficit in the 
European Union, as manifested in rising anti-EU and anti-euro sentiment, not just in the 
periphery, but also in the Eurozone core. 
 
                                                        
5
 Eichengreen, 1992; and Barry Eichengreen, “Is Europe on a Cross of Gold?” Project Syndicate, 11 May 
2002. Online available at: http://www.project-syndicate.org/commentary/is-europe-on-a-cross-of-gold- 
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Background 
The euro was legally born on February 7, 1992 when twelve countries signed the “Treaty 
of European Union” in Maastricht, a Dutch provincial city on the left bank of the river 
Meuse, one of medieval Europe’s main commercial waterways. At the time, the creation 
of the single currency was praised as a visionary act of international statesmanship and a 
courageous step towards European political unity. The reasoning behind the idea seemed 
straightforward: through further economic convergence, EU member states would better 
align their core national interests and grow into a more politically integrated region, 
thereby forever relegating any potential military conflict between them to the distant 
past.6 With the bedrock of the international state system still trembling from a triple 
shock – the fall of the Berlin Wall in 1989, the reunification of Germany in 1990, and the 
collapse of the Soviet Union in 1991 – Economic and Monetary Union (EMU) was 
Europe’s imaginative and bold response to the new geopolitical landscape.7 
 
EMU would incorporate a recently reunified Germany into an ‘ever closer union’ and tie 
Berlin’s fate to the rest of Europe through a common currency and a common monetary 
policy. It would also reassure France and the rest of Germany’s neighbors that the long 
dormant ‘German problem’ – a strong German state at the heart of Europe that was either 
too dynamic or too big for the rest of the continent – would never again resurface. 
Moreover, European elites widely shared the view that the forces of globalization, mostly 
evident in rapidly rising international trade and capital flows, meant a substantial 
hollowing out of the traditional nation-state, and therefore would require an answer at the 
                                                        
6
 See, for example, Ernst B. Haas, Beyond the Nation State: Functionalism and International Organization, 
Palo Alto: Stanford University Press, 1968 
7
 David P. Calleo, Rethinking Europe’s Future, Princeton: Princeton University Press, 2003, chapter 11 
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supranational level. 8  EMU was therefore also seen as the vehicle that would enable 
Europe to compete as a unified economic bloc with a rising Japan, a nascent North 
American free trade area, and other emerging giants, mainly in East and South Asia.9 
 
In 2012, twenty years after the euro was born in Maastricht, and in the midst of the fog of 
a deep European ‘sovereign debt crisis’, most observers agreed that the single currency 
was part of a deeply flawed and poorly designed monetary union. While for most 
economists the problem was that the Eurozone did not meet any of the criteria that would 
have qualified it as an ‘optimum currency area’ (OCA), most political scientists saw an 
incomplete and half-finished monetary union, lacking a true fiscal and banking union, 
and bereft of a common debt instrument to deter the flight to safety out of crisis-stricken 
member countries. Some analysts took it one step further and compared the euro to Dr. 
Strangelove’s “Doomsday Machine” – a scheme devised to eventually trigger a financial 
Armageddon, but once created, impossible to un-trigger.10 
 
Crisis 
What had happened? From the mid-1990s onwards, once economic growth had returned 
after the 1992-93 EMS crisis and recession, Northern European capital – in search of 
higher yields – had flowed en masse into Southern European markets in anticipation of 
the formal introduction of the euro in 1999. Institutional investors and many other 
                                                        
8
 See Alan S. Milward, The European Rescue of the Nation State, London: Routledge, 2
nd
 edition, 2000 
9
 See Calleo, chapter 12 
10
 The reference is to Stanley Kubrick’s cult movie “Dr. Strangelove,” a Cold War black comedy starring 
Peter Sellers, the inventor of the machine. See, for example, Edward Hugh, “Dr. Strangelove and the euro 
‘Doomsday Machine’” CNN Business 360, 22 September 2011. Available online at: 
http://business.blogs.cnn.com/2011/09/22/dr-strangelove-and-the-euro-doomsday-machine/ and Hugo 
Brady, “Europe needs a Rooseveltian break with fear,” Centre for European Reform, 27 July 2012. 
Available online at: http://www.cer.org.uk/publications/archive/bulletin-article/2012/europe-needs-
rooseveltian-break-fear 
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financial market participants implicitly assumed that the impending adoption of the euro 
in those countries was a de facto guarantee against any future sovereign default, which 
shaved off most of the existing national risk premiums that had prevailed on 
Mediterranean country bonds. The initial result of these financial flows was rapid interest 
rate convergence, which held as long as economic times were relatively good – between 
1998 and 2008 – and seemed to vindicate the view that the euro had brought about deeper 
economic integration in the Eurozone. But rather than leading towards convergence, as 
anyone just focusing on EMU sovereign bond spreads would have discerned, this process 
had actually resulted in unsustainably large intra-European balance of payments 
disequilibria. 
 
Over the years, EMU gradually widened the pre-existing gap between a financially more 
orthodox Northern core of ‘surplus countries’ that mainly saved, invested, produced and 
exported, and a debt-laden Southern periphery of ‘deficit countries’ that predominantly 
borrowed, consumed and imported.11 This economic divergence, made possible by the 
euro’s institutional design, which allowed capital to flow freely and quasi risk free across 
EMU borders, created the fertile soil for the European sovereign debt crisis. When the 
bankruptcy of US investment bank Lehman Brothers in the autumn of 2008 triggered the 
Global Financial Crisis, the Eurozone’s structural imbalances would be exposed.12 The 
main consequence for the periphery of such a crisis was a painful process of economic 
                                                        
11
 One could make the comparison with the U.S. housing market between 1997 and 2007. There, a growing 
imbalance was created between aggressive lenders on the one hand, implicitly backed by quasi-government 
owned agencies Fannie Mae and Freddie Mac, and increasingly ‘subprime’ borrowers taking on excessive 
mortgage debt on the other hand. 
12
 As Warren Buffett once remarked: “It’s only once the tide goes out that you learn who’s been swimming 
naked.” As quoted in The Economist, “Indecent Exposure,” 5 August 2007. Online available at: 
http://www.economist.com/node/9609521 
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adjustment, given that by joining the euro they had given up two national shock absorbers 
– devaluation and inflation – leaving austerity (or deflation) as the only viable option on 
the table. In the absence of any solidarity mechanism at the EU level – where the North 
would inflate while the South would deflate, or fiscal transfers from North to South to 
ease the financial blow – the whole burden of adjustment fell onto the periphery, even 
though the core was just as much to blame for the crisis. In a cruel twist of irony, the 
sovereign debt crisis thereby reawakened old political divisions on the European 
Continent; the very problem the euro was introduced to put to rest once and for all. 
In their scramble to keep the euro together, the North – led by Germany – insisted that the 
periphery’s ‘irresponsible borrowing’ was to blame for the crisis. The periphery countries 
therefore needed to implement strict budgetary austerity measures and enact far-reaching 
structural reforms, which were considered to be necessary medicine to rebalance their 
economies. Many in the South – especially in the big economies of Italy and Spain – 
retorted that those policies were misguided and only focused on the borrowers while 
giving the lenders in the North a ‘get out of jail free’ card. Austerity only made the debt 
problem worse in the short term, lacked any symmetric response of stimulus and inflation 
in the North, and ultimately threatened to tear apart the already fragile social fabric in 
periphery countries. Hence, there was a real danger that continued austerity would lead to 
political extremes, which would only serve to accelerate the breakup of the Eurozone, as 
the argument in the South went. 
 
The long duration and depth of the euro crisis, which plunged the Eurozone back into 
recession by the end of 2011, has not only called into question the wisdom behind the 
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euro’s original design, or the overall logic of economic integration underpinning ‘ever 
closer union,’ but has also caused a crisis of democratic governance in the EU. Policy 
matters previously thought to be the primary responsibility of the nation state level – such 
as labor market policies, social security, budgetary priorities, taxation policies and the 
overall size of a government’s bureaucracy – now fall increasingly under the direct 
supervision of the European Commission in Brussels. As national leaders, especially in 
the Eurozone periphery, started to realize that the euro was no longer a magical 
instrument that enabled them to borrow at low German rates, but a compact that severely 
constrained their national economic policy options, long-standing left-right divisions 
between ‘Latin’ Neo-Keynesians (who focus on demand stimulus and are in favor of 
more policy discretion) and ‘Germanic’ Ordo-Liberals (who rely on strict rules and 
emphasize deficit reduction and austerity) on how to respond to a severe recession 
reemerged front and center in the overall EU debate. 
 
As the euro crisis intensified, the monetary policy decisions of the European Central 
Bank in Frankfurt became gradually more politicized, while the fiscal policy decisions by 
the national governments came under increasing scrutiny by the European Commission. 
The consensus that existed from 2003 onwards, prior to the euro crisis, i.e. that monetary 
policy needed to be focused solely on price stability and fiscal policy be conducted by 
rule (The Stability and Growth Pact’s 3 percent deficit-to-GDP and 60 percent debt-to-
GDP ratios), but should allow for some substantial political discretion during hard times, 
would be shattered by the euro crisis in the summer of 2010. 
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Structure of the Paper 
The paper will proceed in six further sections. Section two sets up the theoretical 
framework of the politics of economic adjustment during crisis periods. It will propose a 
simple typology on how to better understand the distributional consequences of the 
chosen method of adjustment. This section will also analyze the changing European 
consensus on the use of monetary and fiscal policy from 2003 onwards and lay out one 
by one the four propositions of the paper, which will then be elaborated upon in the 
subsequent four sections. Section three makes the case for comparing EMU with the 
interwar gold exchange standard, focusing on the method of domestic adjustment during 
periods of stress. Section four examines the economic impact of Europe’s response to its 
sovereign debt crisis in the four ‘peripheral’ countries of the Mediterranean, i.e. Greece, 
Italy, Portugal and Spain (GIPS) and compares it with the policy response to and the 
impact of the 1992-93 EMS crisis, when all four shock absorbers were still technically on 
the table. Section five focuses on the domestic impact of austerity on political legitimacy 
in the four GIPS countries, while section six discusses the rise of anti-EU sentiment and 
the EU’s growing democratic deficit in this context. Section seven concludes. 
 
2. The Politics of Adjustment: Theoretical Framework and Four Propositions 
There exists already a rich and influential academic literature that deals with the politics 
of economic adjustment during periods of crises, much of which examined the different 
national responses during the Great Depression of the 1930s, or the Great Stagflation of 
the 1970s.13 This literature focuses either on structural forces, such as globalization or 
                                                        
13
 See, for example, Peter Katzenstein, Small States in World Markets: Industrial Policy in Europe, Ithaca: 
Cornell University Press, 1985; Peter Hall, Governing the Economy: The Politics of State Intervention in 
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‘Europeanization’ which redefine interests, the mechanics of coalition building during 
periods of uncertainty, the path dependent power of institutions, or the path shaping 
power of ideas. Zeroing in on interests, institutions, or ideas as its main independent 
variable, this literature tries to explain a country’s domestic policy response to 
international economic crises, using various rational choice, historical, or constructivist 
lenses. 
 
These different theoretical approaches have given us great insights into the political 
economy of economic crises and most of these studies, some of them truly path breaking, 
have looked at major advanced industrialized countries that had significant ‘political 
agency’ or policy maneuver room during hard economic times. One of the main points 
this paper makes is that exactly such agency was crucially absent in the member states of 
the Eurozone during the sovereign debt crisis that started in 2010, given the institutional 
design of the euro. 
 
a. Method versus Burden of Adjustment 
A useful way to approach the political problem of economic adjustment is to differentiate 
between the ‘method of adjustment’ a government will embrace in the face of a crisis, 
and which socio-economic groups – can either be domestic or international – will suffer 
the main ‘burden of adjustment.’ Table 1 below proposes a new typology of how to think 
about the four main possible policy responses or shock absorbers during a crisis. The 
                                                                                                                                                                     
Britain and France, Oxford: Oxford University Press, 1986; Peter Gourevitch, Politics in Hard Times: 
Comparative Responses to International Economic Crises, Ithaca: Cornell University Press, 1986; Beth 
Simmons, Who Adjusts? Domestic Sources of Foreign Economic Policy during the Interwar Years, 
Princeton: Princeton University Press, 1994; Mark Blyth, Great Transformations: Economic Ideas and 
Institutional Change in the Twentieth Century, Cambridge: Cambridge University Press, 2002; and 
Matthias Matthijs, Ideas and Economic Crises in Britain from Attlee to Blair, London: Routledge, 2010. 
ACES Cases 2013.3  Matthijs, p. 13 
 
method of adjustment can either be mainly ‘internal’ (deflation or inflation) or ‘external’ 
(devaluation or default); while the burden of adjustment can either fall broadly on debtors 
or creditors (national or foreign), or alternatively, on domestic workers or owners of 
capital. 
 
Table 1: Typology: Method vs. Burden of Adjustment 
 
 
 
 
 
 
 
Method of 
Adjustment 
 Burden of Adjustment 
 
 Debtors/Workers Creditors/K Owners 
 
Internal 
 
 
DEFLATION 
(austerity measures) 
 
 
INFLATION 
(demand stimulus) 
 
External 
 
 
DEVALUATION 
(currency realignment) 
 
DEFAULT 
(debt restructuring) 
 
 
 
The first possible response, ‘deflation,’ in the top-left quadrant, usually entails a 
combination of spending cuts and tax increases on the fiscal side and interest rate 
increases on the monetary side and is transmitted into the macro economy mostly 
internally, i.e. by affecting domestic economic activity in the short term and lowering an 
economy’s wages and prices in the medium term. The main burden of adjustment in the 
case of austerity falls on either debtors, who see the real value of the debts they owe 
increase, or on workers, who tend to have relatively little savings, and might suffer either 
through lower nominal wages (and fixed rent or mortgage payments, for example), lower 
benefits and less generous government services, or higher unemployment. Creditors and 
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capital owners, on the other hand, will see the real value of their savings and outstanding 
loans increase, and will generally be better off. 
 
The second possible response, ‘inflation,’ in the upper-right quadrant, is the other 
‘internal’ method of adjustment, usually enacted through direct increases in government 
spending and cuts in taxes on the fiscal side, or interest rate cuts on the monetary side, 
and normally has a short-term effect on stimulating domestic economic activity by 
pushing up aggregate demand, and raising prices and wages in the medium term. In this 
case, the burden of adjustment will mainly fall on creditors and capital owners, who will 
experience a drop in the real value of their capital and savings, while debtors and workers 
will tend to benefit, either through lowering the real value of their outstanding loans, 
higher nominal wages, or better employment and promotion prospects. 
 
The two domestic policy responses in the bottom row of table 1 will primarily affect 
economic activity through the balance of payments; hence I refer to these as the two 
‘external’ methods of adjustment. In the bottom-left quadrant, a government can choose a 
policy of ‘devaluation,’ i.e. to lower the value of its currency vis-à-vis its main trading 
partners, which will give a short-term boost to exports and make domestic firms more 
competitive with foreign firms, but will lower the purchasing power parity of workers 
and pensioners, whose nominal incomes are fixed, and who will bear the brunt of the 
adjustment since devaluation usually goes hand in hand with higher prices of imported 
goods and services. Debtors who have outstanding loans in foreign currencies will also be 
significantly worse off. However, this quadrant is a bit more complicated, since workers 
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in export industries might be able to keep their jobs, and benefit from devaluation in that 
way, and obviously capital owners will also see their purchasing power damaged by 
devaluation. So, devaluation tends to hit debtors and workers more, but also harms capital 
owners, depending on their consumption patterns. It is probably the response that spreads 
the burden of adjustment the most equally across society.  
 
The final response, ‘default,’ signifies that the government chooses not to make good on 
its promise to pay back its outstanding sovereign debt, either partially or not at all, which 
will mainly affect the creditors to the government and capital owners in the short term. In 
the case of debt restructuring, the government’s creditors could either be domestic 
citizens or foreign nationals. If foreign nationals hold most of the outstanding debt, the 
default option becomes considerably more attractive for a government, given that the 
domestic fallout from default will be relatively restrained, passing on the burden of 
adjustment to foreigners. This final option usually leads to a deep recession, which will 
affect all socio-economic groups in society, and is usually considered only as a last resort. 
 
Between 1945 and the early 1970s, countries in financial distress could dispose of all four 
economic shock absorbers (or a combination thereof) to help them out of a crisis. What 
John Ruggie called the “embedded liberal” compromise, which was struck in 1944 at 
Bretton Woods, had incorporated the main lessons from the Great Depression and 
allowed countries to combine internal (full employment) with external (balance of 
payments) equilibrium through a system of fixed exchange rates, capital controls and 
domestic discretion over monetary policy. Nixon’s closure of the gold window in 1971 
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heralded the beginning of a new era of flexible exchange rates, deregulation, and rising 
international capital flows. Most industrialized countries – including the U.S., Japan, 
Britain, Australia, and Canada, and later the emerging economies of China, India and 
Brazil – kept all four shock absorbers firmly on their menus. While everybody talked the 
talk of market discipline and strict economic policy rules during the early 1990s, in 
practice they were all careful enough to preserve their domestic fiscal and monetary 
policy levers with a variety of capital controls, exchange rate measures, and downright 
prohibitions.
14
 In other words, they all firmly preserved the main tenets of the embedded 
liberal compromise.
15
 
 
The exception was continental Europe, where France and Germany, along with other 
members of the then European Community, gradually surrendered their national 
economic sovereignty and eventually agreed to tie their economic fate together by 
creating a single currency – the euro – in the early 1990s. With the euro’s adoption, EMU 
members put in place a forever-fixed exchange rate to supplant their national currencies, 
controlled by an independent central bank focused exclusively on price stability, but with 
no de facto lender of last resort functions or common debt instrument. By doing so, 
European leaders removed two shock absorbers, inflation and devaluation, from their 
menus of choice. Given the growing importance of international financial markets, and 
the importance of sovereign credit ratings for the liquidity of most countries’ bond 
markets, default also became a much less appealing option, in effect leaving deflation as 
                                                        
14
 See Matthias Matthijs, “How Europe’s New Gold Standard Undermines Democracy,” Harvard Business 
Review Blog Network, August 24, 2012. Online available at: 
http://blogs.hbr.org/cs/2012/08/how_europes_new_gold_standard.html 
15
 Ruggie, 1982 
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the only possible response. By constructing the euro, European elites in effect 
‘disembedded’ the Bretton Woods compromise from their national politics, but without 
putting in place a supranational mechanism of solidarity. During a crisis, international 
commitments would again take precedence over domestic concerns, just like they did 
during the interwar gold standard.
16
 
 
Most advanced industrial countries – from the U.S. to Britain, and Japan to Brazil – could 
spread the burden of adjustment over their political economy’s different constituencies, 
making the politics of adjustment during hard times a lot more sustainable and less 
‘political.’ In the Eurozone, on the other hand, where countries in the periphery suffered a 
series of liquidity and solvency crises, the only possible domestic response was austerity, 
given the euro’s institutional design adopted in the early 1990s. This of course put the 
main burden of adjustment on debtors and workers, seemingly letting off creditors and 
capital owners Scot-free. In a political climate, which puts at least part of the blame for 
the crisis on excessive lending and ‘reckless’ bond investors, and with an increasing 
income gap between rich and poor, higher levels of poverty and rising unemployment, 
the proposition that a majority of a democracy needs to suffer the main burden of 
adjustment – in higher taxes, lower wages, and lower public benefits – is bound to be 
problematic. Furthermore, if such a policy, with significant distributionary consequences, 
would be imposed from a growingly unpopular supra-national entity in Brussels, no 
matter what political outcome national elections produced, the limits of legitimate 
democratic governments would be tested. 
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 Eichengreen, 1992 
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b. Eurozone: Supra-national Monetary Policy vs. National Fiscal Policy 
During the mid-1990s, the overriding consensus in Europe was for a politically 
independent central bank, with a narrow mandate to focus on price stability, and the need 
for economic convergence. At the insistence of Germany and the Bundesbank, the 
Maastricht Treaty established a series of convergence criteria on budget deficits, levels of 
inflation, long-term interest rates, and overall levels of debt, which formed the foundation 
for the Stability and Growth Pact (SGP) that was agreed upon by Europe’s leaders in 
1997. At the heart of the SGP was the 3 percent deficit-to-GDP rule, and an ‘excessive 
deficit procedure,’ since many European countries, most notably Italy and Belgium, had 
overall debt levels well in excess of the maximum 60 percent of GDP as determined by 
the SGP. Limiting member countries’ annual fiscal deficits was seen as the most crucial 
step for the launch of the euro in 1999, and afterwards, for the Eurozone’s stability.17 As 
has been well documented by now, both central founding members – France and 
Germany – were actually the first two countries to break the 3 percent rule in 2003, 
triggering an excess deficit procedure by the European Commission in Brussels, which 
was blocked by the European Council, made up of heads of state. Romano Prodi, the 
President of the Commission at the time, famously called the SGP “stupid,” in reference 
to its rigidity in applying the deficit rule, and pointed out that more flexibility would be 
needed to interpret the rules going forward. 
 
                                                        
17
 Marsh, 2011, pp. 202-11 
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Table 2: Changing Consensus on Economic Policy in the Eurozone (2003-2013) 
 
 
 
 
 
 
 
 
Timeframe 
 Economic Policy Tool 
 
 Fiscal Policy Monetary Policy 
 
 
2003-
2010 
 
Discretion 
(Tax and spending 
legitimate domain of 
national politics) 
 
 
Rule 
(ECB sole mandate of 
price stability, no debt 
monetization) 
 
 
2010-
2013 
 
Rule 
(Balanced budgets 
cornerstone of new 
Fiscal Pact – ‘quasi-
automatic’ sanctions) 
 
 
Discretion 
(LTROs, OMTs) 
(Role ECB much more 
‘politicized’ since euro 
crisis) 
 
 
 
The fiscal transgressions of both Berlin and Paris led the European Council to relax the 
SGP in 2005, by allowing more political discretion in deciding whether a breach of the 3 
percent rule was truly a violation of the spirit of the Pact. The 3 percent and 60 percent 
rules were maintained, but the decision to start an excessive deficit procedure against a 
member country now relied on a set of predetermined parameters. These included the 
exact moment in the business cycle, the overall level of debt, the duration of a period of 
slow growth, or whether the deficit was mainly the result of structural reforms that had 
been enacted and would lower the deficit permanently over the longer term, as had been 
the case of Germany in the early 2000s. So, from 2003 onwards, there was a new 
reigning consensus on the use of fiscal and monetary policy in the Eurozone. Monetary 
policy remained under the technocratic control of the ECB, and was conducted ‘by rule.’ 
The ECB’s only mission was to maintain price stability as measured by an inflation rate 
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of “close to but below 2 percent.” On the fiscal side, the reforms of the SGP in March 
2005 allowed for considerably more political discretion over levels of domestic spending 
and taxation, even though member states promised to remain faithful to the 3 percent 
norm. From 2005 onwards, fiscal policy was firmly under the political control of the 
national governments. This consensus is summed up in the top row of table 2. 
 
With the onset of the European sovereign debt crisis in 2010, there has been a marked 
shift in the consensus on monetary and fiscal policy in the Eurozone. With Greece’s 
admission in the fall of 2009 that its deficits were a lot higher than earlier reported, the 
main cause of the crisis was believed to be ‘fiscal’ and the 2005 reforms of the SGP was 
seen as one of the main culprits for letting the proverbial fiscal cat out of the bag. The 
argument went that as soon as France and Germany, the two founding members of EMU, 
broke the rules, and were let off without punishment by the European Commission, this 
opened the door to other countries – who were not in the midst of deep structural reforms 
to their labor and product markets (as in the case of Germany) – to start running 
excessive deficits. Even though this argument only really holds for Greece – and most 
notably not in the cases of Ireland and Spain, who were both deeply affected by the crisis 
– the obsession with fiscal policy changed the consensus from ‘discretion’ to ‘balanced 
budget’ rules. This formed one of the main principles of the new Fiscal Compact that was 
agreed upon by 25 of 27 member states in December 2011, and signed in March 2012, 
which considerably limited temporary deviations due to exceptional circumstances and 
put in place an automatic correction mechanism.
18
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Furthermore, since 2010, the policies of the European Central Bank in Frankfurt, which 
had enjoyed independence just like its German predecessor, the Bundesbank, in whose 
image it was built, have become a lot more ‘politicized’ given that the ECB has started to 
interpret its mandate a lot more ‘broadly’ than had originally been envisaged.19 Given 
that the impact of its market interventions – from two rounds of Long Term Repurchasing 
Operations (LTROs) in late 2011 and early 2012, which put significant amounts of 
liquidity in the European banking system, to ECB President Mario Draghi’s statement 
that he would do ‘whatever it takes’ to save the euro, to the announcement of potentially 
open-ended Outright Monetary Transactions (OMTs) in early September 2012 – have 
been crucial for the survival of the Eurozone, the ECB has gained remarkable political 
clout in fighting the crisis. Indeed, many financial market participants see it as the only 
institution capable of effectively taking control of the crisis. 
 
Many voices in Europe now claim that the ECB should go even further and outright buy 
the bonds of the countries under stress in the periphery, which would lower their 
sovereign debt yields, and jumpstart economic recovery. Even though the ECB has so far 
stopped short of outright interventions, but clearly holds the key to taming the crisis, most 
analysts applaud its new discretion and policy flexibility. However, more discretion on 
the part of the ECB brings up the question of political legitimacy. If it is the only actor 
that is capable of doing something in the short term, and does not suffer from the 
Olsonian logic of collective action, as do Eurozone finance ministers, should its decisions 
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not be subject to some democratic control? This changed consensus in economic policy 
in the Eurozone since 2010 is summed up in the bottom row of table 2. 
 
The shift in the economic policy consensus in Europe from monetary rule to monetary 
discretion, and from fiscal discretion to fiscal rule, makes the ‘deflationary’ box of table 1 
in which most countries of the European periphery find themselves all the more 
cumbersome. In the past, even though they had no influence over the monetary policies 
of the ECB, they at least had some short-term discretion to stimulate their economies by 
fiscal means, either by cutting taxes or increasing spending. Since 2010, with the fiscal 
consensus in Brussels and Frankfurt shifted to balanced budgets, with strict supranational 
control of national budgets, those countries are even firmer stuck with austerity and 
deflationary policies. Even though the ECB could do more to fight the crisis, given its 
newfound policy discretion, there is nothing individual member states can do to control 
or influence those policies. And given that the ECB has thus far stopped short of outright 
buying bonds of countries in distress, out of fear that that would dampen the enthusiasm 
for fiscal and structural reforms, Frankfurt has become part of the deflationary problem. 
 
c. Four propositions and Four Cases 
Building on the typology juxtaposing method and burden of adjustment, as developed in 
part (a), and the changing economic policy consensus in the Eurozone between 2003 and 
2013 as explained in part (b), I make the following four propositions on the Eurozone 
sovereign debt crisis in this paper: 
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1) Proposition 1: During periods of stress, the Eurozone’s only available domestic 
adjustment mechanism is one of deflation (or internal devaluation), and therefore 
works in a similar manner as the fixed exchange rate regime of the interwar gold 
exchange standard during the 1930s. 
2) Proposition 2: The euro’s original design and the EU’s institutional response to 
the sovereign debt crisis, i.e. austerity, have not only made the recession worse in 
the periphery countries but have exacerbated the debt problem they were 
supposed to solve. 
3) Proposition 3: The Eurozone sovereign debt crisis has created the fertile soil for 
the rise of extreme and anti-establishment parties in the Eurozone periphery. 
4) Proposition 4: The crisis has led to growing nationalism and anti-EU sentiment by 
widening the welfare gap between North and South and questioning European 
solidarity, thereby deteriorating the existing ‘democratic deficit’ in the European 
Union. 
 
The paper will address those four propositions in the next four sections, and focus on the 
four countries of the Eurozone that border the Mediterranean Sea, namely Greece, Italy, 
Portugal, and Spain (referred to in group as the ‘GIPS’ countries), and form the core of 
the Eurozone periphery. This means that I am omitting Ireland and other small Eurozone 
member countries such as Cyprus, Malta and Slovenia, which also have been affected by 
the sovereign debt crisis. The point is that those four relatively small cases (with maybe 
the exception of Ireland, which has a radically different political economy than the rest, 
and in some ways is more dependent on Great Britain than on the Eurozone) are heavily 
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dependent on what happens in the big four countries of the Eurozone periphery, and 
therefore there are strong reasons to believe that the external validity of the findings in 
these four GIPS countries would be quite high.
20
 
 
3. The Euro vs. the Gold Exchange Standard: The Case for Comparison 
 
There are few Englishmen who do not rejoice at the breaking of our gold fetters. We feel 
that we have at last a free hand to do what is sensible. The romantic phase is over, and 
we can begin to discuss realistically what is for the best. 
 
John Maynard Keynes
21
 
 
Lawrence Broz and Jeffry Frieden have noted that “[exchange rate] regime decisions 
involve trade-offs with domestic distributional and electoral implications: thus, selecting 
an exchange rate regime is as much a political decision as an economic one.”22 It would 
be no different for the Eurozone: the institutional design that was chosen in the early 
1990s was not a mere technocratic one, but one that would have far-reaching political 
implications. If one considers the Eurozone to be one country that is completely 
integrated economically and politically, then of course it has a flexible exchange rate 
regime, given that the euro’s value vis-à-vis the U.S. dollar, the Japanese yen or the 
British pound is determined by market forces. Any external adjustment in the case of a 
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Eurozone imbalance with the rest of the world could take place via an appreciation or a 
depreciation of the euro. Given that the Eurozone was broadly in balance with the rest of 
the world by 2010, external adjustment with the rest of the world economy was not the 
problem.  
 
The real issue for the Eurozone is one of intra-EMU adjustment, where current account 
imbalances between, for example, Italy and France, or Spain and Germany, have to be 
settled by ‘internal’ adjustments, which could happen through inflation in surplus 
countries or deflation in deficit countries, or a combination of the two. Given the ECB’s 
commitment to low inflation and a one-size-fits-all interest rate policy however, the 
burden of adjustment will be on the deficit country alone to deflate. This fundamental 
asymmetry was also present in the gold exchange standard, under which surplus countries 
could shift the burden of adjustment to countries in deficit, forcing them to adopt severe 
measures of austerity, with disastrous historical consequences during the 1930s.
23
 
 
A number of academic and non-academic observers have made the explicit link between 
EMU and either the pre-1913 gold standard or the interwar gold exchange standard, some 
of them pointing out the differences while others mainly seeing the resemblances. Barry 
Eichengreen argued that even though there are similarities between the euro and the gold 
exchange standard, in that both systems acted as constraints on reflationary actions, this 
did not mean that the euro’s fate would be similar to that of the gold standard.24 He saw 
four differences between the euro in 2012 and the gold exchange standard in the 1930s: 
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the existence of a single central bank to coordinate monetary action as opposed to 
multiple ones; the presence of much more generous welfare states in today’s Eurozone 
economies compared to the situation in the 1930s; better conditions for a cooperative 
response at the European level under the euro; and the fact that a disintegration of the 
euro would be a lot more disruptive than the abandonment of the gold exchange standard 
proved to be during the Great Depression.
25
 In an NBER working paper, Eichengreen and 
Peter Temin pointed out another analogy between the euro and the gold exchange 
standard, i.e. the need for international coordination, lamenting that the Eurozone’s 
various mechanisms for such intra-EMU coordination – the SGP, the Excessive Deficit 
Procedure, and the Broad Economic Policy Guidelines – have been honored mainly in 
their breach. In their paper, they made a strong case for flexible exchange rate regimes, 
noting that fixed exchange rates might “facilitate business and communication in good 
times but intensify problems when times are bad.”26 
Harold James argued that there is a certain appeal of comparing the euro with the pre-
1913 gold standard. This comes from the fact that there is more pressure on deficit 
countries to adjust through austerity than for surplus countries to adjust by inflating. 
However, he also believes that euro pessimists are too quick to claim that the adjustment 
process is politically unsustainable, since they are missing the very real possibilities that 
the gold standard afforded individual countries, compared to the Eurozone’s institutional 
setup.
27
 James suggests that individual Eurozone members’ national banks should be able 
to have more leeway in setting their own domestic interest rates, as was the case during 
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the classical gold standard, which went a long way towards stabilizing the single 
currency. Writing on the “Economists’ Forum” of the Financial Times, Edward 
Gottesman also made the explicit comparison, referring to the euro as the “21st century 
gold standard.” Gottesman was convinced that adjustment by (external) exchange rate 
devaluation would be a lot quicker than through internal devaluation, which would be 
slower and much more uneven.
28
  
 
David Marsh, in a recent book on the history of the euro, stated that Giscard d’Estaing, 
who was President of France from 1974 to 1981, believed that “the road to European 
money was part of a journey that had been abandoned when the Gold Standard ended.”29 
Marsh also detected a similar line of thinking in Helmut Schmidt, who also saw the need 
for a return to the stability of the pre-war gold standard.
30
 Finally, Harris Dellas and 
George Tavlas, in a working paper for the Bank of Greece, contended that the Greek 
sovereign debt crisis happened exactly because of the absence of an adjustment 
mechanism like the one that existed under the classical gold standard. For them, if the 
euro had actually worked like the gold standard, countries with excessive current account 
deficits would have experienced an outflow of gold, higher interest rates, lower money 
and credit growth, and much more automatic adjustments in wages and prices.
31
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Of course, the gold standard analogy with today’s Eurozone is far from perfect. There are 
some notable differences, as other authors have pointed out. First and foremost, there is 
the ECB, which can print its own gold, as it were, even though it has shown its reluctance 
to do so throughout the crisis. Second, it is far from clear that leaving the Eurozone 
would bring similar quick economic benefits to say, Greece, as it brought to the United 
Kingdom when it chose to abandon the gold standard in 1931. That of course might prove 
not to be a big enough deterrent if the economic situation does not get better in the 
medium term. Third, automatic fiscal stabilizers are a lot more advanced today in Europe 
than they were during the interwar period, and welfare states are more generous and 
better developed, meaning that economies could more likely sustain longer periods of 
deflation today than they could 80 years ago. Also, the classical gold standard in fact did 
have an automatic adjustment mechanism, with surplus countries experiencing an inflow 
of gold and therefore inflationary pressures, while deficit countries saw an outflow of 
gold and thus automatic deflation. One of the problems, however, of the interwar gold 
exchange standard is that those automatic adjustment mechanisms no longer functioned 
when countries resorted to beggar-thy-neighbor policies and trade protectionism. 
 
If one purely focuses on the adjustment mechanism of balance of payments imbalances in 
today’s Eurozone, then a convincing case can be made that it does indeed function like 
the gold exchange standard. Just like in the 1930s, the main obsession of EU 
policymakers during the Eurozone crisis was to tame inflation, while in fact the real 
danger was one of deflation. Eichengreen observed the following about the ideational 
consensus during the 1930s: “There is no little irony in the fact that inflation was the 
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dominant fear in the depths of the Great Depression, when deflation was the real and 
present danger. Precisely because this fear seems so misplaced, its pervasiveness cannot 
be overemphasized.”32 
 
The euro-gold standard comparison is compelling for four main reasons. First of all, just 
like under the gold exchange standard, the Eurozone today has only one adjustment 
mechanism, deflation, given that (a) external devaluation vis-à-vis other Eurozone 
members is impossible, (b) inflation is kept in check by the ECB while demand stimulus 
is hard under the new fiscal rules, and (c) default is the option of last resort given the 
importance of international financial markets for the liquidity of sovereign bond markets. 
Second, just like the gold exchange standard, the Eurozone has led to the formation of a 
relatively well-off and advanced core and a lagging, much poorer periphery, and the 
crisis has only widened that gap. The asymmetry stems from the fact that the core 
countries can force all of the adjustment exclusively onto the peripheral countries. Third, 
the ideological commitment of Europe’s elite to the euro is just as strong as the financial 
and political elite’s commitment to the sacredness of the gold standard in the 1920s and 
early 1930s. Fourth, the Fiscal Compact, which replaced the SGP, and was signed in 
March 2012, committed the Eurozone economies to balanced budgets and limited the 
scope for temporary deviations and calls for automatic correction mechanisms. This 
commitment to fiscal rectitude is reminiscent of U.S. President Herbert Hoover’s 
obsession with balancing the budget, and his Treasury Secretary Andrew Mellon’s view 
of how best to recover from the Great Crash in 1929. 
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Just like the gold exchange standard, as Eichengreen has persuasively argued in Golden 
Fetters, contributed to the length and depth of the Great Depression, so did the 
institutional design of the euro and the EU’s response to the sovereign debt crisis in 2010 
lead to a worsening of the debt problem and a deepening of the recession due to a 
collapse in economic growth. This is the second proposition of this paper, to which I now 
turn. 
 
4. Domestic Economic Impact of Austerity in Greece, Italy, Portugal and Spain 
Liquidate labor, liquidate stocks, liquidate the farmers, liquidate real estate… purge the 
rottenness out of the system. 
Andrew Mellon
33
 
 
Figure 1: Public Debt, 2007-2012 (% of GDP)
34
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Beginning with the Greek bailout in the spring of 2010, the response of the so-called 
‘troika’ (the ECB, the IMF, and the Commission) has been to emphasize debt reduction 
through fiscal austerity measures, in combination with structural reforms, in return for 
direct financial assistance and liquidity. As I have argued in sections 2 and 3, this was the 
logical response given Europe’s choice to abandon the embedded liberal compromise in 
the early 1990s, which would leave austerity as the sole option on the table. As figure 1 
illustrates, the deflationary policies that all four Mediterranean countries have been 
enacting since 2010 have only increased their debt-to-GDP ratios. At the heart of this 
problem is of course simple mathematics and logic. To bring debt-to-GDP ratios down 
one can either try to decrease the numerator (debt) or increase the denominator (GDP). 
Focusing on deficit reduction in the short term might trigger a recession, which will 
actually lower your economy’s GDP, and increase your debt more as long as you are not 
balancing the books. Furthermore, new debt needed to be financed at much higher 
interest rates, given the risk premium over German bunds that financial markets started to 
demand at the onset of the crisis, while old debt had to be rolled over at higher interest 
rates as well. The only country that has managed to get its debt situation under control is 
Germany, and of course Greece, but only after a partial restructuring (or ‘default’) of its 
outstanding debt in 2011 and 2012. 
 
Figure 2 shows how, apart from Greece, all Mediterranean countries had a strong 
recovery in 2010 after the global financial crisis was triggered in late 2008, and the world 
recession it caused in 2009. Greece saw the most dramatic collapse in its GDP, with a 
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cumulative fall in economic activity between 2008 and 2013 of 24 percent, which is the 
equivalent of a full-blown depression. Portugal went into recession in 2011, and Spain 
and Italy also slid back into recession in 2012. At the same time, Germany’s economy 
performed very well in 2011 with a strong growth rate of 3.1 percent, even though it has 
since slowed down to 0.9 percent in 2012. 
 
Figure 2: Real GDP Growth, 2007-2012 
 
 
The rise in overall ratios of debt-to-GDP and shrinking of economic activity in the GIPS 
countries translated into steadily rising levels of unemployment in 2012 (figure 3), with 
Greece topping the list with an unemployment rate of 24.6 percent, followed by Spain 
with 24.1 percent, Portugal with 15.7 percent, and Italy with 10.6 percent. At the same 
time, Germany saw its unemployment rate fall to historically low levels of 5.5 percent in 
2012. But the true damage to the economy is illustrated in figure 4, which shows the 
evolution of youth unemployment between 2007 and 2012.  
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Figure 3: Unemployment Rate, 2007-2012 (%) 
 
 
Figure 4: Youth Unemployment Rate, 2007-2012 (%) 
 
 
The youth unemployment rate measures the level of unemployment for people below 25 
years of age. Spain’s youth unemployment more than tripled from an already high level 
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of 18.2 percent in 2007 to 55.5 in 2012, Greece’s almost tripled from a level of 22.9 
percent in 2007 to 59.4 percent in 2012, Portugal’s more than doubled from 16.6 percent 
in 2007 to 38.6 percent in 2012, while Italy’s almost doubled from 20.3 percent in 2007 
to 38.7 percent in 2012. At the same time, Germany saw its youth unemployment come 
down from an already much lower 11.7 percent in 2007 to just 7.9 percent in 2012. 
Caritas Europa, the global charity group, said in a report citing the European 
Commission’s own statistics, that “this could be a recipe not just for one lost generation 
in Europe but for several lost generations.”35 
 
The economic downturn in Europe has also severely affected personal levels of economic 
well being in the GIPS countries. The GIPS countries saw a steep decline in their real 
average wages since 2009, which is shown on figure 5. Greece is the most dramatic case 
with real average wages falling with 7.1 percent in 2010, 9.1% in 2011, and 12.4% in 
2012, which adds up to a cumulative fall of 26 percent. Furthermore, the crisis has 
increased the risk of poverty, especially for children. According to Caritas, by 2012, three 
out of every ten children in Greece, Italy, Portugal and Spain, were either living in 
poverty or had been pushed to the brink of poverty. The Eurozone crisis thus has created 
a sizeable “under-class” of inadequately fed and poorly educated young people with low 
morale and scant employment prospects. And worst of all, for the European project of 
integration, it has noticeably widened the gap between North and South. 
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Figure 5: Average Real Wages (% change) 
 
 
Figure 6 shows the evolution since 2004 of European Union citizens’ judgment on how 
well their national economies are performing, and whether they expect things to get 
worse, or get better, as measured twice a year by the European Commission in their 
Eurobarometer. While an overwhelming majority (72 percent) judges the overall 
economic situation to be ‘bad’ during the fall of 2012, this masks the much starker 
regional differences. In Greece, 99 percent of all people polled thought their country’s 
economy to be doing ‘bad,’ while in Spain 98 percent thought so, with 93 percent of 
Italians and 89 percent of Portuguese sharing a similar ‘bad’ judgment. If you compare 
those figures with Germany (75 percent judged the overall economic situation to be 
‘good’), Luxembourg (70 percent ‘good’), Austria (65 percent ‘good’) and Finland (55 
percent ‘good’), you can only conclude that the divide between the Eurozone’s Northern 
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core and Southern periphery is substantial. It makes the calls for more intra-EMU 
‘solidarity’ all the much louder. 36 
 
Figure 6: How would you judge the current situation in your national economy?
37
 
 
 
Though no historical comparison is perfect, it is worth looking at the effects on economic 
growth after the 1992-93 EMS crises, when Italy, Spain and Portugal were all forced to 
leave the European Exchange Rate mechanism (ERM) temporarily and had to devalue 
their currencies vis-à-vis the German mark, the EMS’ anchor currency.38 The Italian lira 
left the ERM in mid-September 1992, and was immediately devalued by 7 percent. 
Between September 1991 and March 1995, the Italian government devalued the Italian 
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lira by more than 60 percent against the German mark in order to gain competitiveness.
39
 
It would only rejoin the ERM in late 1996. The Spanish peseta was devalued by 5 percent 
vis-à-vis the German mark in September 1992, while the Portuguese escudo and the 
Spanish peseta (again) were devalued by 6 percent in October 1992. In May 1993, the 
peseta and the escudo were again devalued further vis-à-vis the D-mark. 
 
One can see from figure 7 that, while all countries were in recession in 1993, the recovery 
in 1994 and 1995 was a lot stronger and a lot quicker than was the case for the Eurozone 
sovereign debt crisis. Though the nature of the 2010 debt crisis is very different from the 
1992-3 EMS currency crisis, and the world economy saw strong growth in 1994 and 
1995 thanks to a booming American economy, one should not dismiss out of hand the 
role devaluation played in the Mediterranean recovery of the mid-1990s. In any event, the 
perception that those economies could recover as quickly as they did after a substantial 
devaluation is central to this paper’s point, emphasizing the importance of the exchange 
rate as a crucial shock absorber during hard times. In further evidence of the effectiveness 
of some exchange rate flexibility, even under a fixed rate system, a 2003 IMF research 
paper by Solomos Solomou provided new evidence for the crucial role real exchange rate 
adjustment played in speeding up economic recovery in the periphery during the gold 
standard.
40
 Compared to devaluation, deflation tends not only to be much slower but also 
a lot more unequal.
41
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Figure 7: Real GDP Growth, 1991-1996 
 
 
The crisis that engulfed the Eurozone from 2010 onwards had serious consequences for 
the economies of the periphery, with sharp falls in national income, rising debt, steep 
increases in unemployment, and truly disastrous levels in youth unemployment, but it has 
also started to have a negative impact on the Mediterranean countries’ domestic political 
institutions. As a result, the euro crisis triggered a crisis of political legitimacy 
domestically, with electorates openly questioning the effectiveness of their traditional 
political class and policy elite, but also stirred up growing anti-EU sentiment in a way 
Europe had not experienced since the signing of the Treaty of Rome in 1957. I will 
briefly discuss both propositions in the next two sections, before concluding the paper. 
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5. Domestic Political Impact of Deflation in Greece, Portugal, Italy and Spain 
But political resignation, alienation and cynicism, combined with growing hostility 
against “Frankfurt” and “Brussels”, and a growing perception of zero-sum conflict 
between the donors and the recipients of the “rescue-cum-retrenchment” programs, may 
create the conditions for anti-European political mobilization from the extremes of the 
political spectrum. In the worst case, therefore, the attempts to save the Euro through the 
policies presently enacted may either fail on their own terms, or they may not only 
undermine democracy in EU member states but endanger European integration itself. 
 
Fritz W. Scharpf
42
 
 
As Eichengreen has argued, the interwar gold exchange standard in the end was doomed 
mainly for political reasons.
43
 The big difference between the pre-1913 and interwar gold 
standard was the radically different political climate that emerged after the Great War. 
First, the spread of universal male suffrage as the norm across Europe made domestic 
economic policy goals such as high growth, rising standards of living, and low 
unemployment, which came at the cost of external equilibrium and currency stability, a 
lot more important. Second, the existence of powerful labor unions and social democratic 
parties to represent their direct interests made a policy of deflation or austerity a lot 
harder to swallow in a democracy, compared to say 1870, when there were no such 
constraints. The rise and consolidation of power by Mussolini in Italy in 1922, Hitler in 
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Germany in 1933, and Franco in Spain in 1936 underscored the potential dangers of the 
popular discontent with the deflationary policies associated with the gold standard, which 
led to a sweeping overturn of fragile democratic settlements in interwar Europe. 
 
I by no means want to argue that the introduction of the euro and the 2010 sovereign debt 
crisis will lead over time to new experiments with autocratic government in Southern 
Europe, as happened during the 1920s and 1930s. There is however a real danger, 
especially in Greece and Italy, but also in Spain and Portugal, of a significant and lasting 
shift of the electorate from the moderate center to more radical left wing or right wing 
extremes. Freedom House, for example, gave both Greece and Italy a lower ranking in its 
2013 Freedom in the World Report, with Greece going from a score of 1.5 to 2 compared 
to two years earlier, with a lower score for ‘political rights’, while Italy went from a score 
of 1 in 2012 to a score of 1.5 in 2013, with a worse score in civil liberties, increasing 
from 1 to 2.
44
 The Economist Intelligence Unit downgraded Greece, Portugal and Italy 
from ‘full democracies’ in 2010 to ‘flawed democracies’ in 2012, even though they 
expected the downgrade for Portugal to be temporary. Spain was also downgraded, but 
remained a ‘full democracy’ even though with the lowest score.45 Also, trust in national 
parliaments across the European Union have gone down from 43 percent of the 
population in the spring of 2007 to 28 percent in the fall of 2012, with a similar 
downward trend in trust in national governments, falling from 41 percent to 27 percent 
over the same period. Again, there are stark differences between North and South, with 
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trust in national political institutions at a much lower level in the Mediterranean 
countries.
46
 
 
From a domestic political perspective, Greece and Italy were the worst affected by the 
euro crisis; their traditional political elites were unable to form governments that could 
cope with the debt crisis, and as a result saw anti-democratic experiments with unelected 
technocrats. In Greece, George Papandreou was forced to resign after he called for a 
national referendum in early November 2011 on the terms of a new EU-IMF bailout, and 
was replaced by Lucas Papademos, a former vice-president of the European Central 
Bank, with the tacit support of Brussels, until new elections were held in May 2012. 
Those elections turned out to be inconclusive, with the mainstream centrist parties unable 
to form a government, and the rise of extreme left political movement SYRIZA who 
refused to abide by the EU’s terms, and an almost 10 percent share of the vote for 
extreme right neo-nazi party Golden Dawn. The country was forced to vote again in June 
2012, under pressure of financial markets and while flirting with a Eurozone exit, and the 
Greek voters delivered a fragile coalition led by the center-right leader Antonis Samarras.  
 
In Rome, Prime Minister Silvio Berlusconi effectively lost his majority, and proposed to 
resign under the condition that the legislature approve his austerity budget for 2012, 
which it duly did on November 12. Mario Monti, another unelected technocrat and a 
former European Commissioner for Competition, took over from Berlusconi with 
markets initially responding negatively as Monti’s government formation was delayed. 
Monti lasted just over a year, after having pushed through a series of unpopular austerity 
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measures, and tax and labor market reforms. The new elections in February 2013 
delivered a devastating verdict for Monti, who scored just around 10 percent of the vote, 
with the new leftist anti-euro and anti-establishment “five star” movement led by an 
obscure and relatively unknown comedian, Beppe Grillo, achieving close to 25 percent of 
the vote. The center-right, led by Berlusconi, openly critical of Europe’s approach to the 
crisis, especially the ‘German’ view of austerity, almost beat the center-left led by 
Giuseppe Bersani. That election also produced an inconclusive result with a clear 
majority for the center-left in the lower house, but no majority in the senate. Finally, 
center-left politician Enrico Letta managed to put together a fragile new ‘centrist’ 
coalition, which included many technocrats in late April 2013, but it remains to be seen 
whether Italy’s new government can be effective and avoid new elections. 
 
While Spain and Portugal have been governed by relatively stable center-right 
governments since 2011, and were likely to complete their four-year terms in 2015, 
reform fatigue has clearly set in, and Spain has to cope with a more strident secessionist 
movement in Catalonia. Both Portugal and Spain have also effectively lost their 
economic sovereignty, as both have had to submit to severe conditionality from the EU-
IMF-ECB troika in return for a full-fledged bailout in the case of Portugal and a bank 
bailout in the case of Spain. In all four Mediterranean countries, austerity measures have 
fueled popular discontent, and all have seen riots and street violence increase since the 
onset of the 2010 crisis.  
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Part of the reason their countries’ electorates are turning against their political elites is 
because of the perception that the elites no longer control their own country’s future, but 
instead are being run by Brussels’ unelected technocrats. No matter what the outcome is 
of a national election, it is clear that the deflationary course their countries have been put 
on by Europe since 2010 cannot be changed. This growing awareness of Europe’s 
negative influence on a country’s economy and welfare, as well as this perceived 
violation of their countries’ sovereignties, has rekindled anti-European and anti-euro 
sentiments across the region. The already existing democratic deficit of the European 
Union seems to be growing wider as the crisis wears on. And interestingly enough, Euro 
skepticism has not just been on the rise in the Mediterranean, but also in the rest of the 
European Union, including Germany and Austria, both countries that ostensibly have 
‘gained’ from the crisis, and are doing quite well economically. 
 
6. The Rise of Anti-EU Sentiment across Europe 
Who knows Olli Rehn? Who has ever seen the face of Olli Rehn? Who knows where he 
comes from and what he has done? Nobody. And at the same time, he is the one who tells 
us how to run our economic policy. 
Paul Magnette
47
 
 
While the Euro crisis has weakened domestic political institutions in all four countries of 
Southern Europe, the anti-EU and anti-euro sentiment has been on the rise since the dawn 
of the crisis. While European citizens’ trust in their national governments and parliaments 
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has been falling since 2007, the same is true for their trust in the European Union, which 
started with approval ratings of 57 percent in the spring of 2007 and were down to 33 
percent in the fall of 2012. Yet again, the overall number masks the significant North-
South differences, with even lower ratings in Greece, Italy, Portugal and Spain.
48
 Also 
the EU image has suffered. When asked whether “the EU conjure[s] up for you a very 
positive, fairly positive, neutral, fairly negative or very negative image,” the total 
‘negatives’ have gone up from just 14 percent in the fall of 2007 to 29 percent in the fall 
of 2012, and the total ‘positives’ have fallen from a high of 52 percent in 2007 to just 30 
percent in 2012.
49
 When asked about the single currency, the euro, specifically, there is 
also a worrying trend across the EU. While 63 percent of all Europeans supported the 
euro in early 2007 while 31 percent was against, only 53 percent still supported the euro 
in the fall of 2012, with 40 percent against. Here also, the EU wide average concealed the 
wide variety of opinions across the continent.
50
 
 
In a special “Eurobarometer” on the future of Europe, with fieldwork conducted in 
November 2011, and published in April 2012, questions on trust in the political system 
showed a marked discrepancy between whether citizens thought their voice counted in 
Europe or in their own country. Only 26 percent of EU citizens agreed that their voice 
counted in the EU, in contrast with 52 percent of EU citizens who agreed their voice did 
count in their own country. 65 percent of EU citizens did not agree that their voice 
counted in the EU, compared with only 43 percent who did not agree that their voice 
counted in their own country. On the question whether ‘my voice counts in the EU’ only 
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15 percent of Greeks, 16 percent of Italians, and 27 percent of Portuguese and Spaniards 
tended to agree, compared to 47 percent of Germans, and 55 percent of Belgians and 
Dutch. The same divergence is observed on the question whether ‘my voice counts in my 
country,’ with 15 percent of Greeks, 18 percent of Italians, 35 percent of Portuguese and 
45 percent of Spaniards agreeing, while a total of 70 percent of Germans, 74 percent of 
French, and 81 percent of Dutch and Finnish agreed.
51
  
 
Heather Grabbe, the head of EU affairs for the Open Society Institute, noted that her 
studies of anti-EU populists have shown anti-EU sentiment to be far higher and far 
deeper than election results have indicated since the onset of the 2010 crisis. Grabbe was 
quoted by the Financial Times as saying that “the euro crisis is a crisis of governance 
because people are feeling very angry and are looking for people to blame.” According to 
Grabbe, they are mainly angry because they feel that their national governments have lost 
all control over the economy.
52
 Anti-euro and anti-EU sentiment is not just on the rise in 
Southern Europe, but also in unexpected places like Austria and Germany. In Bavaria in 
Germany, for example, the anti-bailout Free Voters movement made significant inroads 
in regional elections and is aiming to upend the German national vote in September 2013 
with a harsh critique of EU crisis management.
53
 Also, a new party led by economists, 
jurists and Christian democratic rebels has been formed in Germany, openly calling for 
an end of the euro and a return to the German mark. Anti-euro sentiments are also 
brewing in Finland, with the True Finns party – which combines ethno-nationalism with 
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left wing economic policies – nearly ousting the ruling government party in national 
elections in 2011, and Austria, where “Team Stronach” – an anti-euro party founded in 
response to the crisis – polled around 10 percent of the vote in two regional elections in 
early 2013. 
 
7. Conclusion 
 
The euro is much more than a currency. The monetary union is a community of fate. This 
is our historic task. If the euro fails, then Europe will fail. 
 
Angela Merkel
54
 
 
This paper has made four propositions. First, it has argued that the euro’s institutional 
design made it function like the interwar “gold exchange standard” during periods of 
stress. Also, just like the gold standard, the euro created a core of surplus countries and a 
periphery of deficit countries, in which the latter had to sacrifice their internal domestic 
economic equilibrium in order to restore their external equilibrium, and thus had no 
choice but to respond to balance of payments crises by a series of deflationary spending, 
price and wage cuts. The paper’s second claim was that the euro’s institutional design 
and the EU’s response to its ‘sovereign debt crisis’ during 2010-13 deepened the 
recession in the Eurozone periphery, as EMU leaders focused almost exclusively on 
austerity measures and paid only lip service to the need to rebalance growth between 
North and South. 
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As Barry Eichengreen argued in Golden Fetters, the rigidity of the gold standard 
contributed to the length and depth of the Great Depression during the 1930s, but also 
underscored the incompatibility of the system with legitimate national democratic 
government in places like Italy, Germany, and Spain, which was the basis for the paper’s 
third proposition: the euro crisis instigated a crisis of democratic government in Southern 
Europe underlining that democratic legitimacy still mainly resides within nation states. 
By taking on the euro, EMU member states gave up their ability to control major 
economic policy decisions, thereby damaging their domestic political legitimacy, which 
in turn dogged attempts to enact structural reforms. Evidence of the erosion of national 
democracy in the Eurozone periphery can be seen in the rise of anti-establishment parties, 
and the inability of traditional center-left and center-right parties to form stable 
governments and implement reforms. The paper’s fourth proposition was that the euro’s 
original design and the Eurozone sovereign debt crisis further widened the existing 
democratic deficit in the European Union, as manifested in rising anti-EU and anti-euro 
sentiment, as well as openly Eurosceptic political movements, not just in the euro 
periphery, but also in the euro core. 
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